AFTER DIALLO: FIXING THE ENTIRE SYSTEM

You don’t have to be a protest marcher to be left shocked, pained and feeling more than a little bit empty inside by the acquittal last week of the four New York City police officers who shot Amadou Diallo to death.

As one New Yorker observed, “The system did not fail those four cops, but it did fail Amadou Diallo.”

Who said that? Was it Jesse Jackson? Al Sharpton? Johnnie Cochran?

No, it was a New York City police detective named Lucas Miller, reflecting on the verdict in the on-line magazine Slate.

You don’t have to be a street protestor to be outraged that “the system” that was supposed to protect Diallo killed him instead.

Many protesters have compared the Diallo case with that of Abner Louima, who was physically assaulted Aug. 9, 1997, in a New York City police station. Diallo’s case also has been compared to the current Los Angeles Police Department’s Rampart Division scandal, in which rogue officers are accused of framing people, lying on the witness stand and even shooting unarmed suspects.

But, the police in the Diallo case were not rogues. Their claims that they were following proper procedures raise serious questions about the procedures and the system that created them.

Assigned to the city’s “street crimes unit,” the officers were seeking a multiple-rape suspect when they confronted Diallo, 22, an immigrant from Guinea, in the vestibule of his Bronx apartment building.

Diallo, confronted by men in plainclothes pointing guns at him, pulled out a black object that police thought was a gun, but which turned out to be a wallet. They fired 41 rounds at him, hitting him with 19 bullets. It was all a terrible mistake, the cops tearfully insisted on the witness stand during the trial held in Albany.

The prosecutors argued that the vestibule was well lighted, that there was a pause in the police gunfire and that Diallo had been on the ground when most of the shots were fired.

But the officers described how they perceived themselves to be in danger in a confusing urban version of the “fog of war.” One officer yelled “gun” when he saw the wallet. The officers heard a shot, which turned out to be one of their own. They saw a muzzle flash, which turned out to be a reflection in the glossy wall paint. One officer happened to trip and fall, causing others to think he had been shot.

Their argument, that ultimately the police officers have the right to protect themselves by any means necessary, won the day. The prosecution did not present a scenario that was much different from that which the defense described. Jurors said afterward that they were left with too much reasonable doubt to convict any of the officers.

But troubling questions remain. Why didn’t the officers pull back when confronted by a man holding an unknown object? Would they have been as quick to shoot if Diallo had been white? Were the officers programmed to fail by poor training, poor guidance and poor knowledge of the neighborhood and its people?

The system worked for the officers when an appeals court ordered the case moved to Albany. Juries in the Bronx are notoriously critical of police, so Diallo’s neighbors were denied the right to be potential jurors. Now, as a belated tribute to Diallo, the city should go back to the Bronx and ask why its residents feel so terrorized by the police upon whom they also depend for protection.

Even before the Diallo trial, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s police department took steps to reform the “special crimes unit.” More officers have been told to wear uniforms. More experienced officers have been assigned to work with younger ones. More of the special units have been put under local district supervision, instead of operating as floating squads sent into unfamiliar neighborhoods like the Diallo quartet was.

It is tragic that it took the death of Diallo to bring about these badly needed reforms. It would be a greater tragedy if Diallo’s death did not alert New York City and the rest of the nation to how much more needs to be done.

It is possible to reduce crime without terrorizing the citizenry. We should look to those cities that have succeeded in helping neighborhoods to work with police, build trust and reduce crime, along with charges of police misconduct, at the same time. In Boston, for example, the Ten-Point Coalition of church ministers, led by Rev. Eugene Rivers, has been working with police, the mayor’s office and the courts since 1992. Juvenile homicides were reduced to zero in 1995 and 1996 and have remained in the single digits ever since. Officials from other cities, including New York, have been making pilgrimages to Boston to learn from that city’s success.

New York’s “special crimes unit,” assigned mainly to remove guns from the street, no matter how many stop-and-frisk searches it takes, has been credited with helping reduce crime in New York City by two-thirds. But effective law enforcement breaks down when police enter neighborhoods in the manner of an occupation force.

Tempers have flared long enough. The best way for us to remember Amadou Diallo, an African who wanted to be an American, is to turn down the heat.

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