Two years ago Tuesday, the shuttle Columbia disintegrated on its way back to Earth, killing all seven astronauts and shattering confidence in NASA’s system of safety checks and balances.
The result: When Discovery blasts off from Kennedy Space Center–as early as mid-May–the maze of decisions behind the final “go” call will have changed dramatically.
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Officials say Discovery will be a safer vehicle thanks to improvements made since the accident. But the key question is how the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will ensure that no one relaxes its newer, stronger safety rules–the kind of erosion that marked the period between the 1986 Challenger accident and the loss of Columbia.
The first part of the answer is NASA’s expanded safety net, designed to hand direct responsibility, and accountability, to experts within the shuttle program.
They report to the chief engineer, who has a direct line to the agency’s administrator. Together, they can stop work on a particular component, and ultimately stop a launch.
This new internal oversight system is independent of the shuttle program in power structure and in budget.
At the recommendation of the special accident board, NASA moved to create a network of people, or “warrant holders,” responsible for each part of the complex shuttle machinery. The agency has designated 24 warrant holders so far–for areas such as the shuttle’s main engines–and will add more in the coming months.
These warrant holders are responsible for ensuring that the shuttle program lives by its safety rules. And while they work inside the program, their boss, chief engineer Rex Geveden, reports directly to the head of NASA.
These people will now decide whether any of the requirements for flight are waived, which was a common practice before the 2003 accident. They have the power to flag a potential problem and stop work while they seek to understand and fix it–and shuttle managers can’t stop them because of budget or schedule issues.
Another key safety group, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, was changed after the Columbia accident. The entire panel resigned in the fall of 2003, and NASA chief Sean O’Keefe named members with no aerospace experience. Instead, he chose safety and management experts and told them he wanted them to track the slippery subject of changing the agency’s safety culture.