The sale of MAPATS to a South American nation disturbs some U.S. officials, who view it as an example of the difficulty of controlling U.S. technology once it leaves the country, even when the technology goes to a friendly nation such as Israel.
But that is only one of the concerns expressed privately by U.S. officials.
Behind the scenes at the Justice Department, Customs Service and Pentagon, officials said they think Israel has grown too aggressive in its quest for American technology.
”The prevalent view here is that the Israelis are trying to get whatever they can, however they can,” one law-enforcement official said. ”People stop short of saying it is a `well-orchestrated effort,` but I don`t know what else you can honestly call it. They`re trying to get everything they can.”
Israel`s espionage in the U.S. made the headlines last year with the arrest of Navy intelligence analyst Pollard, who admitted spying on the U.S. as part of an Israeli ring. He is now cooperating with the government.
Pollard was nabbed outside the Israeli Embassy in Washington as he sought asylum. He since has identified several Israelis involved in the operation, including science attache Yagur, a secretary at the Israeli Embassy and an intelligence officer in Israel.
Israel apologized publicly for the affair, saying it was ”an unauthorized deviation from the clear-cut Israeli policy of not conducting any espionage activities whatsoever in the United States.” The Justice Department and FBI are continuing to investigate the extent of the ring.
The Pollard affair was followed by a series of disclosures of other federal investigations. Top-ranking Israeli government officials have taken a hard line in response to the other disclosures, repeatedly denying any wrongdoing and protesting publicly and privately to U.S. officials about what they consider an unfair campaign against Israel.
After raids by Customs agents last December in connection with an attempt by Israel to obtain technology for chrome-plating tank cannon barrels, Israeli officials contended the raids were ”anti-Israel” and part of a ”vendetta.” Yet information obtained from court documents, military records and interviews show the tank-barrel episode illustrates many of the concerns expressed by law-enforcement officials.
In late 1984, the Israeli procurement mission requested bids from U.S. companies to build a chrome-plating facility in Israel for Israel Military Industries. The contract was to be financed by $1.8 million in U.S. military aid.
The successful bidder was NAPCO Inc., a small electroplating company in Terryville, Conn.
In winning the contract, a company lawyer said NAPCO stressed to the Israelis that it had a crew, under an Army subcontract, working on a new chrome-plating process for 120 mm. tank barrels inside the Army arsenal at Watervliet, N.Y.
But the proposed contract submitted by Israel to the Pentagon for routine approval contained no reference to tank barrels. The document said the technology was to chrome plate ”hydraulic tubing and cylinders.”
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said in a letter to a congressman this year, ”There was no mention or implication in the contract provided by the government of Israel for financing approval that the technology involved was for large caliber cannons.”
Chrome-plating the lining of cannon barrels extends their life and enhances accuracy. A cathode conducts electricity through an anode, which causes the chrome to adhere to the inside of the barrel.
The U.S. was five to seven years ahead of the rest of the world in chroming 26-foot cannon barrels for tanks because of a unique configuration of anodes and cathodes developed at the arsenal. The transfer of the technology to any other country is specifically prohibited by federal law.
Soon after signing its contract with Israel, members of the NAPCO crew at Watervliet sketched the anodes and cathodes at the arsenal and delivered the drawings to company officials, said William Flannery, a lawyer for NAPCO.
Flannery and Ray Banoun, a defense lawyer hired by NAPCO, said the company had not violated the law in sketching the devices, because the technology was not restricted. They said the devices were in an open area at the arsenal, and arsenal personnel were aware that sketches had been made.
But federal agents said authorities at the arsenal did not discover what was going on until months later.
On Oct. 16, 1985, Thomas Mahar, a metals expert for the Army at Watervliet, made a routine visit to an arsenal subcontractor in Pennsylvania and was stunned to find the company manufacturing anodes based on the arsenal`s design.
A company executive told Mahar the anodes were for Israel under a subcontract with NAPCO and showed Mahar photocopies of hand-drawn sketches of the anode provided by NAPCO.
The executive later told a Customs agent that representatives of NAPCO and Israel Military Industries had visited the plant in the spring of 1985 and authorized production of the anodes.
Mahar`s discovery touched off a federal investigation that led to raids of three U.S. companies last December. A government affidavit said the raids were part of an investigation of a possible conspiracy to steal the arsenal`s technology and transfer it illegally to Israel.
The federal investigation is continuing, said David Homer, the assistant U.S. attorney in Albany, N.Y., who is handling the case.
Federal grand juries in Iowa and Pennsylvania are conducting inquiries into a similar attempt by the Israelis to obtain technology to make cluster bombs.
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Cluster bombs are metal pods containing hundreds of smaller bombs that explode individually, spewing shrapnel over a wide area. The U.S. halted shipment of cluster bombs to Israel in 1982 after the Israelis used them against civilians in the invasion of Lebanon.
Israel responded by stepping up production of its own cluster bombs for its use and for export. But U.S. defense experts said the Israeli technology was far behind that of American manufacturers.
In 1985, Israel Military Industries signed contracts with companies in Iowa and Pennsylvania to produce machinery that would vastly improve its ability to produce the bombs.
As in the case of the chrome-plating technology, the machinery was to be paid for with U.S. military aid and the contracts were arranged by the Israel Defense Procurement Mission in New York.
U.S. Customs agents raided both plants last July and halted the shipment of machinery to Israel. Several employees of the New York purchasing mission were subpoenaed by the grand juries, but the subpoenas were dropped after Israel pledged to cooperate in the probe.
Israeli officials have denied trying to skirt export laws and have maintained they had proper licenses for the cluster bomb machinery. American officials said at least one employee of the Israeli purchasing mission had suggested the export licenses be written in a way that disguised the military use of the machinery.
In a slightly different twist, the Customs Service is investigating allegations by Recon/Optical Inc., of Barrington, Ill., that Israel tried to steal the technology for a supersophisticated aerial reconnaissance system that Recon was developing for the Israelis under a $40 million contract paid for with U.S. military aid.
Three Israeli air force officers who had been monitoring the project at Recon for two years were stopped when they tried to leave the plant last May with 50,000 pages of documents in Hebrew. Recon contends the documents contained technical information that could not be provided to Israel under U.S. export law.
The Israeli Defense Ministry said it was entitled to the technology under the contract negotiated by the procurement mission with Recon and approved by the U.S. government.
Israel was more successful in obtaining krytrons, which are 2-inch electronic tubes used to trigger nuclear bombs and as timing devices in many conventional weapons.
A California aerospace engineer and computer expert, Richard K. Smyth, was indicted last year on charges that he illegally exported 800 krytrons to Israel between 1980 and 1982.
Smyth was a consultant to NATO and the U.S. Air Force, with a top-secret U.S. clearance. He ran a small firm outside Los Angeles that developed computer software for the military. Prosecutors also say Smyth used the company to make at least 10 illegal shipments of krytrons to Heli Trading Ltd. in Tel Aviv.
The krytron order came from one of Heli`s owners, Arnon Milchan, who was acting on behalf of the Israeli Defense Ministry.
Milchan is an Israeli millionaire with close ties to the government. He was identified widely as a participant in a money-laundering scandal in the mid-1970s involving Israel`s role in South Africa`s attempts to buy newspapers and TV stations around the world to improve Pretoria`s image. Milchan also has produced Hollywood films, such as ”Once Upon a Time in America,” which is about Jewish gangsters.
Smyth first tried to obtain the krytrons for Milchan in 1975, but the State Department refused to grant an export license because the devices were on a list of restricted technology.
When he got another order from Milchan in late 1979, the government said Smyth mislabeled the krytrons and shipped them without a license.
The Israeli government claimed to be unaware that the krytrons had been exported illegally, and it eventually returned 460 unused devices. Israel said the rest were used in research and development.
U.S. intelligence agencies have thought for more than a decade that Israel makes nuclear weapons, but the Israeli government has said only that it will not be the first country to use nuclear weapons in the Mideast.
Last month, an Israeli told the London Sunday Times that he worked for 10 years in a top-secret, underground bunker in the Negev desert where Israel manufactured components for its nuclear weapons. The Israeli, Mordechai Vanunu, disappeared last month.
Last week, Israeli officials admitted they are holding Vanunu ”under lawful detention,” but refused to give further details.
Smyth`s attorney, Alan Croll, has indicated in court papers that the California case involves issues more extensive than krytrons.
He said U.S. authorities uncovered the shipments after Smyth reported a suspicious burglary at his offices in January, 1983. Computer software was taken, but the burglars left other valuable property.
The CIA was the first agency to investigate the break-in, Croll said, and he said Smyth had provided information to the CIA in the past.
Croll, who no longer represents Smyth, refused to expand on his court filings in an interview. William Fahey, the assistant U.S. attorney handling the case, said he did not know what Croll meant by more significant issues. Fahey said the investigation remains open.
Smyth`s company records indicate that he did a large amount of business with Israel. Federal law-enforcement sources said investigators suspect Smyth obtained other restricted military technology for Israel over a long period.
A new mystery developed Aug. 14, 1985, when Smyth didn`t show up for a court appearance. Authorities later said he and his wife vanished from their sailboat. A few months later, relatives said an anonymous caller told Smyth`s mother-in-law that the missing engineer and his wife were safe.
U.S. intelligence reports indicate Smyth and his wife were seen in at least three European countries in late 1985 and earlier this year, according to law-enforcement sources.
”The latest intelligence is that Smyth is in Israel,” one of the sources said.